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Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis, international swap lines between central banks of advanced economies and their counterparts in emerging market economies were introduced as a coordinated policy initiative. Empirical studies by Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) , Moessner and Allen (2013) , and Baba and Shim (2010) show supportive evidence that these international swap lines (hereafter, swap lines) were coincident with reductions in Covered Interest Parity (CIP) or Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. The country-level studies argue that swap lines prevented systemic risk and limited contagion during periods of market stress. Although empirical studies have been able to identify macroprudential benefits arising from swap lines, a shortcoming of the literature is its narrow focus on country-level responses to swap lines. Country-level data do not shed light on the channels through which swap lines impact banks, i.e., the beneficiaries of the foreign liquidity provision. The country-level studies assume banks are homogenous. 1 We know very little how banks with different characteristics respond to swap lines.
The objective of this paper is to determine the average daily impact of swap lines on stock returns using bank data from emerging markets. The identification strategy estimates the difference-in-difference of stock prices of Hungarian and Polish banks relative to other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries conditioning on swap lines.
In particular, we focus on Swiss National Bank (SNB) swap lines with the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB). 2 To identify the bank-specific response to swap lines, we examine the importance of bank characteristics. These characteristics include the level of foreign currency exposure, the funding structure, the ownership type, and the capital structure.
The empirical results are presented for two levels of aggregation, at the country and bank levels. We first show the country-level finding that stock returns of banks increased with SNB swap lines. This empirical result is consistent with the view that swap lines with the SNB improved liquidity conditions in CEE between 2008 and 2010. In a second stage 1 For example, Goldberg et al. (2011) and Bruno and Shin (2014) acknowledge that European and Korean banks did not make equal use of liquidity provisions provided by swap lines. 2 The experience in CEE before the financial crisis, particularly in Hungary and Poland, is overshadowed by the rapid growth of residential mortgage loans denominated in Swiss francs. The problem of currency mismatches became acute after the Swiss franc appreciated strongly during the financial crisis and many CEE banks were excluded from the interbank market for Swiss francs. of the analysis, the importance of bank characteristics is examined. We show that the country-level approach masks a richer set of bank-level findings.
The paper makes three contributions to the literature on unconventional measures and their impact on banks. 3 To our knowledge this is the first study to examine the impact of swap lines on banks. The new evidence on liquidity provision in emerging markets shows that stock prices of domestic and less-well capitalized banks respond strongly to SNB swap lines. 4 A second contribution is to show that the success of swap lines is not dependent on currency choice. Swap lines are normally defined for exchange rates between the home currency and a major reserve currency (i.e., in U.S. dollar, euro, or yen) . This, however, was not the case for swap lines between the SNB and CEE central banks. These swap line agreements were between the euro and the Swiss franc.
A third contribution shows that gains from swap lines beyond national jurisdictions were limited and/or only temporary. Only Hungarian and Polish banks benefited from swap lines between the SNB and the NBP and between the SNB and the MNB during the whole period of the swap line. The transmission of liquidity provision through swap lines does not follow the same cross border channels as liquidity shocks generated by other unconventional measures (i.e., quantitative easing). 5 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the motivation for SNB swap lines with the MNB and the NBP. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
SNB swap lines and CEE banks
Swiss franc and other foreign currency loans to the non-banking sector were extremely popular in CEE before the financial crisis. 6 Households and small firms increasingly borrowed in a lower-yielding foreign currency to finance their mortgages or business 3 Our paper is closest in spirit to Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Alfaro et al. (2014) . The study by Chodorow-Reich (2014) investigates the impact of FOMC announcements on CDS spreads, bond yields and equity prices of financial institutions. Similarly, the paper by Alfaro et al. (2014) examines the impact of Brazilian capital controls on stock prices of Brazilian firms. 4 For the literature on swap lines and emerging markets see, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) , Baba and Shim (2010) , and Bruno and Shin (2014) . 5 For example, studies by Fratzscher et al. (2013) and Bauer and Neely (2014) show that liquidity shocks arising from asset purchases in advanced countries have spillover effects for emerging market economies. 6 Kraenzlin (2011), Beer et al. (2010) , and Yesin (2013) discuss in detail Swiss franc lending in CEE. Brown and de Haas (2012) , Brown et al. (2011), and Brown et al. (2014) study the determinants of FX lending in CEE. investments. The shaded columns in Figure 1 show the share of foreign currency loans as a percentage of total loans to the non-banking sector in select CEE countries for 2009:Q1. 7 Figure 1 shows that at the height of the financial crisis, the majority of the outstanding loans to the non-banking sector in several CEE countries was denominated in foreign currency. The same figure also illustrates that Swiss franc loans were particularly popular in Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Serbia, and Romania. In the remaining countries, euro loans probably comprised the vast share of foreign currency loans.
As the financial crisis escalated so did the funding tensions in Swiss francs for many CEE banks. The interbank market for Swiss francs, which funded a large share of the CEE bank activities, was impaired. Further, most CEE banks lacked access to a Swiss francdenominated deposit base or the domestic operations of the SNB (the SNB accepts nondomestic banks as counterparties). This situation of market stress reduced credit lines for Swiss francs to CEE.
In this context, the SNB entered into temporary swap line agreements with several central banks between 2008 and 2010. Their objective was to improve the liquidity conditions for the Swiss franc in international financial markets. Table 1 lists the major swap line agreements involving the SNB. The most relevant SNB swap line agreements for this study are shaded grey in Table 1 . These agreements were with the European Central Bank (ECB), the NBP, and the MNB.
The first agreement between the SNB and the ECB was a weekly swap line beginning on October 20, 2008. This swap line was euros for Swiss francs with no prespecified limit. The objective was to provide Swiss franc funding to banks in the euro area jurisdiction.
A second swap line agreement between the SNB and the NBP began on November 17, 2008. The NBP joined the weekly EUR/CHF swap auctions between the SNB and the ECB. Under this agreement, the SNB provided the NBP with Swiss francs against euros, while the NBP provided Swiss francs to its counterparties and received Polish zlotys.
A third swap line agreement between the SNB and MNB began on February 2, 2009. The terms and conditions were similar to the previous agreements with the ECB and the NBP. 8 On January 18, 2010, it was communicated that the last EUR/CHF swap 7 The date 2009:Q1 is the first available observation from the CHF Lending Monitor, an ongoing project of the Swiss National Bank with the aim to understand the scope of Swiss franc lending in Europe. 8 An open issue is whether the SNB swaps were supported by ECB cooperation agreements with the NBP and MNB. These central bank cooperations were collateralized transactions that allowed the NBP and MNB to obtain euros. ECB (2014), which reviews the history of ECB swap line agreements with other central banks operation with the ECB, the NBP, and the MNB would be on January 25, 2010. Figure 2 shows swap volumes between the euro and the Swiss franc for the three SNB swap agreements with the ECB, the MNP, and the NBP. Positive values reflect borrowing of Swiss francs by foreign central banks. The aggregate position is shown because the SNB did not publish separately volumes for the three central banks. 9 The figure shows a growing demand for Swiss francs with a peak volume of 62 billion CHF in March 2009. Thereafter, the volume drifts towards zero before the end of 2009. A further swap line agreement designed to extend Swiss franc liquidity was the temporary reciprocal currency arrangements between the Federal Reserve (Fed), the ECB, the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), and the SNB. These agreements were announced on April 6, 2009 and were terminated on February 1, 2010. Although this swap line was not actively used, it will be considered in the empirical analysis.
The empirical setup
The analysis of the stock price response of CEE banks to SNB swap lines is conducted at the country and bank levels. The country-level regressions begins in the spirit of Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) and Bruno and Shin (2014) which study the impact of Federal Reserve swaps on interest rates in emerging markets. Thus our first regression tests the hypothesis that swap lines improve liquidity conditions and this improvement is reflected in higher stock prices for banks in countries with swap lines. The empirical specification is as follows:
where R i,j,t denotes the bank performance measured as the change in the ln share price of a CEE bank i in country j at time t. The dummy variable, | , is the interaction term | × | used in Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) and Bruno and Shin (2014) This practice has been used in Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) , Baba and Shim (2010) , Moessner and Allen (2013) , Bruno and Shin (2014) , and others. Thus in our analysis in section 5, a response effect of bank stock prices on SNB swap lines cannot be interpreted as evidence that banks made use of the Swiss franc liquidity. Rather the bank's stock price increased on the information that it had access to liquidity provisions. Hence, the timing of the swap dummies needs to be interpreted as defining periods of liquidity access when financial markets were under stress and not as a volume effect. 10
The second part of our analysis relaxes the assumption that financial markets responded uniformly to swap lines. Our objective is to allow for structural features of CEE banks affect the response to liquidity access via the swap line. Below four propositions that condition on bank characteristics are discussed in terms of their stock price responses to swap lines.
Proposition # 1: Banks with high levels of foreign currency exposure benefit more from swap lines than do banks with low levels of foreign currency exposure.
The assumption is that banks with (long-term) foreign denominated assets are unable to refinance their (short-term) foreign currency liabilities during periods of financial market stress. Because many financial markets for foreign currency (i.e., Libor, national interbank market) were impaired during the financial crisis, swap lines served the function of liquidity provision. Therefore, we expect stock prices of banks with high levels of foreign currency loans to respond positively to liquidity access through swap lines.
Proposition # 2:
Banks with a higher dependence on short-term funding are more reliant on swap lines.
This proposition says that a bank's funding structure matters when markets are impaired. The crisis has clearly exposed the dangers of a bank's excessive reliance on wholesale funding (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; and Huang and Ratnovski, 2011) and previous studies showed that banks with excessive short-term funding ratios are typically more vulnerable to market conditions and liquidity risk (López-Espinosa et al., 2012) . Under proposition 2, stock prices of banks with a high reliance on the interbank market are expected to respond positively to swap lines.
Proposition # 3: Foreign owned banks are less reliant on swap lines than are domestic banks.
The proposition says that the response of bank stocks depends on bank ownership and their interconnectedness with foreign parent banks. This proposition is also consistent with Bruno and Shin (2014) . The proposition highlights the view that foreign owned banks enjoy access to secure foreign currency lines through their parent bank. However, domestic banks are liquidity constrained when local interbank markets are impaired. This means stock prices of domestically owned banks should respond more strongly to swap lines than 10 The empirical section also considered the signalling effect associated with the swap line announcement dates. These results are discussed in the empirical section. stocks of foreign owned banks.
Proposition # 4:
Banks with a weak capital structure are reliant on swap lines.
Swap lines act as a lifeline in that they allow (distressed) banks that suffer from counterparty risk time to find new (foreign denominated) liquidity. Considering that previous studies showed that capital enhances the performance of banks during banking crises (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013) , banks with a higher capital base should be less reliant on swap lines. In this case, the swap line takes on a financial stability function in that they are providing liquidity to less-well capitalized banks.
To test these four propositions at the bank level, the baseline specification defined by equation (1) is extended to include information for bank i. The bank-level regression equation takes the following form:
The variable, , , ℎ , captures bank specific information: information on the bank's foreign currency exposure, funding structure, ownership type, and capital structure. Our test is the interaction term between the swap line dummy and bank specific information, | * , , ℎ . If the interaction term is significant and positive, then this statistical evidence is consistent with the view that individual banks with particular characteristics benefitted from swap lines more than the country average. Such evidence also suggests that banks did not respond uniformly to liquidity provision.
Data
The dataset comprises balance sheet information for 47 commercial banks operating in 15 CEE countries from January 3, 2005 to December 31, 2012. 11 The data set is constructed in the following manner. We start with all the banks in the Bankscope database that are listed. BankScope collects data on 92 publicly traded commercial banks from CEE in 2012, but only for 64 have detailed financial information for at least 5 years. We then exclude banks for which Thomson Reuters Datastream did not provide data for stock prices. Also, hand-collected information on FX risk for each bank for each year from the bank's annual reports and financial statements is available for 47 banks. Of these 47 banks, 18 are local (domestically owned) banks and 29 are foreign-owned banks. 12 Appendix 1 lists the banks in our sample.
In order to assess the stock price response of Hungarian and Polish banks controlling for bank specific characteristics, we consider following four categories of bank characteristics: a) the level of foreign currency exposure; b) the funding structure; c) the ownership type (i.e., foreign or domestic control); and d) the capital structure.
Following previous studies on foreign currency borrowing (see Basso et al., 2011; Fidrmuc et al., 2013; Luca and Petrova, 2008) we use six measures of foreign currency exposure to test proposition 1: the share of assets in CHF measured as the ratio of assets in CHF to total assets; the share of assets in foreign currencies measured as the ratio of total assets in foreign currencies to total assets; the net position in CHF measured as the ratio of assets in CHF minus liabilities in CHF to total assets; the net position in foreign currencies measured as the ratio of total assets in foreign currencies minus total liabilities in foreign currencies to total assets; the share of liabilities in CHF measured as the ratio of liabilities in CHF to total liabilities; the share of liabilities in foreign currencies measured as the ratio of total liabilities in foreign currencies to total liabilities.
The second bank characteristic is the bank's funding structure used to test proposition 2. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) , Altunbas et al. (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012) , we define funding fragility as the ratio between the sum of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short-term borrowing over total deposits plus money market and short-term funding.
The third bank characteristic is foreign ownership and international connectedness used to test proposition 3. Foreign ownership is defined as a dummy variable to be +1 if 50% or more of banks stocks are foreign owned (Claessens and van Horen, 2014), otherwise 0. International connectedness is defined by membership in a banking group. It is a dummy variable +1 if the bank is a subsidiary of an international banking group with 12 As in Claessens and van Horen (2014), we classify banks into foreign and local banks depending on whether 50% or more of the bank's stocks are owned by foreigners or by central, local governments or domestic private actors. Across CEE countries, foreign ownership in the banking sector has grown dramatically in the recent decade, and by 2008, foreign banks controlled around 80% of the assets in the regions banking industry. Western banks such as Raiffeisen Bank International, Erste Bank, UniCredit, Intesa, KBC, or regional banks such as OTP and NLB, are a dominant force in CEE (EIB, 2013) . In our sample, 18 banks are subsidiaries of an International Banking Group with a large exposure to a region (at least 5 subsidiaries in CEE region). at least 5 subsidiaries in the CEE region, otherwise 0. This dummy measures the role of international connectedness without an explicit structure for ownership type.
The fourth bank characteristic is the capital structure of banks used to test proposition 4. As in Demirguc- Kunt et al. (2013) , two measures of capital structure are used. The first variable is CAP1ijt, which is the total capital ratio (the risk-adjusted regulatory capital ratio) calculated according to Basel rules. It is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital divided by risk-adjusted assets and off-balance sheet exposures. The second variable is CAP2ijt, which is defined as Tier 1 Ratio. It is calculated as Tier 1 divided by risk-adjusted assets and off-balance sheet exposures. 13 To isolate the impact of swap lines on stock returns of CEE banks, four control variables are considered. 14 The first variable is the VIX index of implied volatility in S&P500 index options. The VIX index reflects aggregate financial market volatility, as well as the price of market volatility, see Adrian and Shin (2010) . Higher market uncertainty should be negatively correlated with the return in bank stocks. The second control variable is the EMBIG spread that measures the risk aversion towards emerging markets (Everaert et al, 2015) . A higher EMBIG spread should determine a decrease of the bank stocks return as this indicator reflects the global perceptions of risks in emerging 
Empirical Results
This section presents empirical results on the stock price response of CEE banks to SNB swap lines. The results are presented in two subsections. The first subsection documents country-level responses to swap lines. The second subsection records bank-level responses to swap lines.
The sample is from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2012. All regressions include the VIX uncertainty variable, the EMBIG spread, the one-day return of the EUR/CHF exchange rate, and the STOXX Europe 600 banks index return, and three lags of the dependent variable as controls. In addition, country fixed effects, time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects in all specifications to control for omitted variables. The standard errors in all regressions control for country cluster effects. 16 The estimated coefficients of the control variables are consistent with their priors.
The coefficient of the VIX variable is negative and highly significant. In other words, bank stock prices increase with lower uncertainty. Similarly, the coefficients of the EMBIG spread that measure the global perceptions of risks to emerging market countries is negative and significant. The coefficient of the change in the ln EUR/CHF exchange rate is positive and significant. This is also consistent with the prior that a weaker Swiss franc is coincident with an increase in bank stock prices that are exposed to currency risk. The coefficient of the European bank index return is positive and significant in all regressions. This result says that there is strong co-movement between stock prices of European and CEE banks.
Country-level responses to SNB swap lines
The country-level responses to SNB swap lines yield three empirical findings. First, stock prices of Hungarian and Polish banks responded positively to SNB swap lines with the NBP and the MNB. This finding extends the country-level results of Bruno and Shin (2014) and others using CDS and interest rate spreads for a new asset class, namely stock prices.
Second, the swap line between the SNB and the ECB had no impact for CEE banks in the euro area. This result suggests that other countries in the euro area, i.e., Austria and Italy, had possibly a larger demand for Swiss francs than the CEE countries in the euro area, i.e., Slovenia and Slovakia. Third, multilateral swap lines between the SNB and major central banks had no impact on stock prices of CEE banks. In other words, CEE banks only benefitted from swap lines if their country's central bank had a swap line agreement with the SNB. This result suggests that CEE financial markets were highly segmented during periods of market stress and gains from swap lines beyond national jurisdictions were limited. , that captures periods when the SNB-NBP and/or the SNB-MNB swap lines were active in the two countries. The coefficient of the swap line agreements is 0.2327 and is statistically significant. This coefficient says that stock prices of Hungarian and Polish banks increased daily on average 0.23% more than the CEE average during the period when the swap lines were active. This is equivalent to an accumulated return of 7.25% over the period of the swap line. For completeness, we Next, results from robustness tests with different sample periods are shown in Table   3 . We focus on the joint dummy for SNB-MNB and SNB-NBP swap lines, its value is lower than before. This suggests that the liquidity effect was strongest in the beginning of the swap agreement. Nevertheless, it is still statistically significant and economically relevant. On the other hand, the date dummy is no longer statistically significant. This result suggests that potential spillovers from swap lines outside national jurisdictions were only temporary. The positive and statistically significant results from the date dummy shown in Table 2 may be attributed to an announcement effect across CEE stock markets. Table 4 include an announcement dummy that corresponds to the time period between the announcement of the swap line agreements and the time when they were first effective. The regressions in Table 4 Next, we test the robustness of | against other SNB swap lines with major central banks. remains positive and significant, whereas the coefficients of the two multilateral swap lines are much smaller and in two cases negative. Further, the statistical significance is not established for the multilateral swap lines. We interpret these country-level results as follows: there was no spillover effect of multilateral swap lines between major central banks to the CEE. Banks in CEE benefited only from having direct access to liquidity via the SNB swap lines.
In the next subsection, the specification in column 1 in Table 2 without | is treated as the baseline. The exclusion of the time dummy, | , is motivated by the non robustness result in Table 3 in the shorter sample (the result suggests that potential spillovers from swap lines outside national jurisdictions were only temporary and we are interested in the liquidity effect during the whole duration for banks with different characteristics). To test the four propositions outlined in section 3, bank specific information together with its interaction with the swap dummy is added to the baseline specification.
Bank-level responses to SNB swap lines
This subsection presents evidence on the stock price response of Hungarian and Polish banks controlling for bank specific characteristics. The findings show that bank characteristics are important for understanding the stock price response to swap lines. The bank characteristics are motivated by the four propositions discussed in section 3. They include information on the bank's foreign currency exposure, funding structure, ownership type, and capital structure. The empirical findings show that the response of bank stocks to swap lines is dependent on bank characteristics. Table 6 presents regressions that test proposition 1's conjecture: higher currency exposure should result in a higher stock price response. The results for exposure measured as share of FX or CHF assets or liabilities show that stock prices of CEE banks with a high foreign currency exposure recorded a lower return than banks with less FX assets or liabilities. Next, the interaction terms between foreign currency exposure and | are considered. There is strong evidence that stock prices of Hungarian and Polish banks with a high foreign currency exposure in their asset and/or liabilities position responded positively to swap lines. Our results show that banks with a larger exposure on CHF assets or liabilities (Model 1 and Model 5) benefited more than banks with a larger exposure on FX assets or liabilities (Model 2 and Model 6). Results from Models 3 and 4 reveal that the net position in CHF or foreign currencies does not impact the stock return. Table 7 presents information on the stock price response to information on a bank's funding structure. Funding structure is proxied by funding fragility. Proposition 2 says that the stock price of banks relying on short-term funding will respond positively to a swap line agreement. Funding fragility has a coefficient of -0.1362 that is highly significant. This says that if a bank's funding structure is short term, the bank's stock price falls. However, the coefficient's sign reverses for Hungarian and Polish banks when they have access to swap lines. The interaction of swap lines and funding fragility has a coefficient of 0.1819 and is statistically significant. From this evidence, we conclude that the funding structure is an important factor in explaining the stock price response to swap lines. Table 8 presents regressions that test the importance of ownership structure. The evidence is consistent with proposition 3. The proposition says that foreign-owned banks have access to foreign exchange through the parent bank, however domestic banks do not enjoy this form of liquidity insurance when interbank markets are impaired. The prior is the stock price of local banks should respond positively to swap lines. To test this, column 1 in Table 8 presents a regression which introduces a foreign ownership dummy (+1 when more than 50% of the bank's assets is foreign owned) and the interaction term to the baseline specification. The coefficient of the foreign ownership dummy is 0.0428. This says that the return on stock prices of foreign owned CEE banks was on average higher than local CEE banks. Next, the coefficient of the foreign ownership dummy interacted with the swap dummy is -0.0342 and is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result says that stock prices of local banks in Hungary and Poland increased more than the average Hungarian and Polish bank during the period of the swap line.
An alternative measure of international connectedness, defined as member of a banking group, is considered in column 2 of Table 8 . The dummy, banking group, is +1 when a bank is part of a banking group with subsidiaries in at least five countries in the CEE region. Note, this form of organizational structure does not imply foreign ownership and therefore possible access to foreign exchange through the parent bank. The results for bank group show that the coefficient of the dummy is 0.0303 and statistically significant.
However, the coefficient of the interaction term is 0.0154 and statistically significant at the 10% level. This result highlights the importance of ownership as opposed to connectedness, because the stock price of banks active in international banking groups benefitted from liquidity access through swap lines. Table 9 presents evidence consistent with proposition 4 that says swap lines supported CEE banks with a weak capital structure. In other words, the stock price of banks with a less sound capital structure responded strongly to swap lines. To see this, column 1 in Table 9 presents a regression that adds the total capital ratio of banks (CAP1) and their interaction term ( | * 1) to the baseline regression. The coefficient for CAP1 is close to zero and statistically insignificant, yet the coefficient of the interaction term is -0.0279 and is statistically significant. This result says that the stock price of Hungarian and Polish banks with a higher capital ratio did not increase as much as those with a low capital ratio. Next, the regression with Tier 1 capital (CAP2) is presented in column 2. Again, the coefficient of the capital structure term, CAP2, is nearly zero but statistically insignificant. However, the interaction term, | * 2, is -0.0187 and statistically significant. From this evidence, we conclude that the stock price of lesswell capitalized banks in Hungary and Poland responded more strongly to the timing of a swap line agreement than did the stock price of banks with a more sound capital structure.
This result suggests, whether intended or not, swap lines also had a financial stability dimension.
Conclusions
The strong response of CEE bank stocks to swap lines suggests that this unconventional form of liquidity provision impacted a broader range of financial assets (i.e., interest rate spreads, CDS rates, or exchange rates) than has been previously examined. The analysis for bank stocks reconfirms findings in previous studies that gains from swap lines outside national jurisdictions were limited and/or temporary. This empirical finding re-enforces the desire of emerging market economies to sign international swap lines with central banks of major currencies.
The analysis of bank stocks also allow us to go one level deeper and to determine whether swap lines triggered asymmetric response effects at the bank level. The literature has until now assumed that financial assets respond uniformly to swap lines. The banklevel analysis suggests that the effectiveness of international swap lines is also partially dependent on the structure of a country's banking system. Stock prices of local and lesswell capitalized banks, as well as banks with a higher foreign currency exposure and higher reliance of short-term fund responded the strongest to swap line agreements. This new evidence is consistent with the view that swap lines were not only important in providing liquidity but also took on functions associated with micro-prudential concerns. Source: SNB press releases. 
where R i,j,t denotes the bank performance measured as the change in the ln share price of a CEE bank i in country j at time t; the variable, | = | × | , is +1 for the period and country when the swap lines with country or group X are active and 0 otherwise and denotes one of the This table reports the results of regressions that examine the impact of the SNB swap on Hungarian and Polish banks using different sample periods. We estimate alternative versions of the following regression specification: In Model 3 we report estimates for the period after 15 September 2008 -Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy until 23 April 2010 -Greece officially requests financial support from the euro area countries and the IMF. We include country fixed effects , time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects , in all specifications to control for omitted variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent: Bank performance
Model 1 reports the results of regressions that examine the impact of the SNB swap on Hungarian and Polish banks. We estimate alternative versions of the following regression specification:
where R i,j,t denotes the bank performance measured as the change in the ln share price of a CEE bank i in country j at time t; the variable, | = | × | , is +1 for the period and country when the swap lines with country or group X are active and 0 EMBIG spread -to control for global perceptions of risks to emerging market countries; Exchange rate (CHF/EUR) return -to control for movements on FX markets; European banking systems performance (STOXX® Europe 600 Banks index return) -to control for European banking system overall performance. We include country fixed effects , time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects , in all specifications to control for omitted variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively reports the results of regressions that examine the impact of the SNB swap on Hungarian and Polish banks controlling for the other major central banks' swap agreements. We estimate alternative versions of the following regression specification: EMBIG spread -to control for global perceptions of risks to emerging market countries; Exchange rate (CHF/EUR) return -to control for movements on FX markets; European banking systems performance (STOXX® Europe 600 Banks index return) -to control for European banking system overall performance. We include country fixed effects , time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects , in all specifications to control for omitted variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively This table reports the results of regressions that examine the impact of the SNB swap on Hungarian and Polish banks controlling for the level of foreign currency exposure. We estimate alternative versions of the following regression specification: | * i,j, denotes the interaction between SNB-CEE swap variable and FX variables; R i,j,t−k -lagged (k=1, 2 and 3) values of dependent variable; the ℎ t captures (macroeconomic) control variables and include VIX -to control for investor sentiment and market volatility; EMBIG spread -to control for global perceptions of risks to emerging market countries; Exchange rate (CHF/EUR) return -to control for movements on FX markets; European banking systems performance (STOXX® Europe 600 Banks index return) -to control for European banking system overall performance. We include country fixed effects , time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects , in all specifications to control for omitted variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively Dependent: Bank performance Table 7 Controlling for funding structure This table reports the results of regressions that examine the impact of the SNB swap on Hungarian and Polish banks controlling for funding structure. We estimate alternative versions of the following regression specification: _ measured using Funding fragility -the ratio between the sum of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short term borrowing over total deposits plus money market and short-term funding; | * _ i,c, denotes the interaction between SNB-CEE swap variable and Funding structure variables; R i,j,t−k -lagged (k=1, 2 and 3) values of dependent variable; the ℎ t captures (macroeconomic) control variables and include VIX -to control for investor sentiment and market volatility; EMBIG spread -to control for global perceptions of risks to emerging market countries; Exchange rate (CHF/EUR) return -to control for movements on FX markets; European banking systems performance (STOXX® Europe 600 Banks index return) -to control for European banking system overall performance. We include country fixed effects , time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects , in all specifications to control for omitted variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively This table reports the results of regressions that examine the impact of the SNB swap on Hungarian and Polish banks controlling for degree of international connectedness. We estimate alternative versions of the following regression specification: denotes one of the alternative measure for degree of international connectedness: Foreign ownership is a dummy variable taking a one if 50% or more of banks' shares are owned by foreigners; Member of Banking group is a dummy variable taking a one if the bank is a subsidiary of a International banking group with at least 5 subsidiaries in CEE region; | * i,j, denotes the interaction between SNB-CEE swap variable and Degree of international connectedness variables; R i,j,t−k -lagged (k=1, 2 and 3) values of dependent variable; the ℎ t captures (macroeconomic) control variables and include VIX -to control for investor sentiment and market volatility; EMBIG spread -to control for global perceptions of risks to emerging market countries; Exchange rate (CHF/EUR) return -to control for movements on FX markets; European banking systems performance (STOXX® Europe 600 Banks index return) -to control for European banking system overall performance. We include country fixed effects , time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects , in all specifications to control for omitted variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively Table 9 Controlling for capital structure This table reports the results of regressions that examine the impact of the SNB swap on Hungarian and Polish banks controlling for capital structure. We estimate alternative versions of the following regression specification:
R i,j,t = β 1 × | + β 1 × _ i,j, + β 1 × | * _ i,j, + Σ 1= R i,j,t−k + ℎ t + + + ε i,j,t where R i,j,t denotes the bank performance measured as the change in the ln share price of a CEE bank i in country j at time t; the dummy variable SNB-CEE ( | ) -is a dummy variable taking a one if the bank operates in Hungary for period 2 February 2009-25 January 2010 or in Poland for period 17 November 2008-25 January 2010;
_ denotes one of the alternative capital structure measure: Cap_struct1 = Total capital Ratio; Cap_struct2 = Tier 1 Ratio; | * _ i,j, denotes the interaction between SNB-CEE swap variable and Capital structure variables; R i,j,t−k -lagged (k=1, 2 and 3) values of dependent variable; the ℎ t captures (macroeconomic) control variables and include VIX -to control for investor sentiment and market volatility; EMBIG spread -to control for global perceptions of risks to emerging market countries; Exchange rate (CHF/EUR) return -to control for movements on FX markets; European banking systems performance (STOXX® Europe 600 Banks index return) -to control for European banking system overall performance. We include country fixed effects , time (quarter) fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects , in all specifications to control for omitted variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. We use ***, **, and * to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively Daily stock return calculated as R i,j,t = ln ( , , − , , −1 ), where , , denotes the daily stock price for bank i in country j for day t. Thomson Reuters
SNB-CEE
Dummy variable is +1 if the bank operates in Hungary for the period from 28 January 2009 to 25 January 2010 or in Poland for the period from 7 November 2008 to 25 January 2010; otherwise 0.
SNB press releases SNB-ECB
Dummy variable is +1 if the bank operates in any member country of the Euro zone for the period from 16 October 2008 to25 January 2010; otherwise 0.
SNB press releases

SNB-MNB
Dummy variable is +1 if the bank operates in Hungary for the period from 28 January 2009 to 25 January 2010; otherwise 0.
SNB press releases SNB-NBP Dummy variable is +1; if the bank operates in Poland for the period from 7 November 2008 to 25 January 2010; otherwise.
SNB press releases
SNB-USD
Dummy variable is +1 if SNB has Dollar Liquidity Swap Lines with the FED or other banks for the periods from 12 December 2007 to 1 February 2010 and from May 2010 to 31 December 2012); otherwise 0.
SNB press releases
SNB-CBs
Dummy variable is +1 if SNB has CHF Liquidity Swap Lines with other central banks for the periods from6 April 2009 to 1 February 2010 and from 30 November 2011 to 31 December 2012; otherwise 0.
SNB press releases
Date
Dummy variable is +1 for the period when the swap lines with country or group X are active and 0 otherwise 0.
SNB press releases
Country
Dummy variable is+1 for the country or group X which had a swap lines with SNB; otherwise 0.
SNB press releases
SNB-Signal
Dummy variable is a preliminary announcement dummy and is +1 for the previous 5 working days to the period and country when the swap lines with country or group X are active; otherwise 0.
SNB press releases Share of assets in CHF Assets in CHF/ Total assets. Annual Reports
Share of assets in foreign currencies
Total assets in foreign currencies/ Total assets.
Annual Reports
Net position in CHF (Assets in CHF -Liabilities in CHF)/Total assets.
Net position in foreign currencies (Total assets in foreign currencies -Total liabilities in foreign currencies)/Total assets. Annual Reports
Customer deposits
Total Customer Deposits / Loans. Bureau van Dijk -BankScope
Funding fragility
The ratio between the sum of deposits from other banks, other deposits, and short term borrowing over total deposits plus money market and short-term funding.
Bureau van Dijk -BankScope
Foreign ownership
Dummy variable is +1 if 50% or more of banks' shares are owned by foreigners; otherwise 0. Bureau van Dijk -BankScope
Member of Banking group
Dummy variable +1 if the bank is a subsidiary of a International banking group with at least 5 subsidiaries in the CEE region; otherwise 0.
Annual Reports
Cap_struct1
Total capital Ratio Bureau van Dijk -BankScope
Cap_struct2
Tier 1 
